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COMPUTER SERVICES AND THE FEDERAL
REGULATION OF COMMUNICATIONS
The linkage of widely separated locations to a central data mass
or message-switching control has entailed a growing dependence upon
communication networks by data processing services. At the same
time, the major communication carriers are employing digital com-
puter systems to provide faster, more efficient service.' It is estimated
that more than sixty per cent of the computer hardware used in the
United States will be tied into the public communication systems
by 1975 2 and as much as ninety per cent by 1984.'
The resultant increased availability of computer services will make
many new conveniences available to the consumer. These advan-
tages, however, tend to overshadow the serious problems of regulatory
policy which necessarily will arise. The immediate problem is clear
-the current regulations governing the communications industry are
inadequate to deal with the interaction of the two services, while to
the communications carriers, such computer services seem a natural
adjunct which they should be able to offer in combination with exist-
ing communication services. The problem is further exacerbated by
the fact that the carriers are regulated under the Communications Act
of 1934,' while the data processing and services utilizing the modern
digital computer thus far remain unregulated. Recognizing the in-
evitable significance of these problems for federal regulatory policy,
the Federal Communications Commission, in November, 1966, pub-
lished a notice of inquiry requesting comments and suggestions on
the interdependence of computers and communication services and
facilities.5
As one response to that notice of inquiry, this Comment un-
fortunately is limited by the present lack of empirical data necessary
to reach confident conclusions on some of the policy issues presented.
It is hoped, however, that its legal as opposed to factual or economic
approach may help channel any future factual investigation as well
as outline possible alternatives open to the FCC.
I Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation., 76 YALE L.J. 1299,
1301-02 (1967) ; Pierce, The Transmission of Computer Data, ScIENTIc AXmMCAN,
Sept. 1966, at 145.
2 Address by Bernard Strassburg, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau of the FCC,
The Communications Carriers and Management Information Systems, before the
Institute on Management Information and Data Transfer Systems, at American
University, Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 1965.
8 Letter from Mr. Walter Bauer, President, Informatics, Inc. to Mr. Ben F.
Waple, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Dec. 9, 1966.
447 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
15 1n re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, FCC Notice of Inquiry, FCC




The FCC investigation was sparked by a dispute between Western
Union, a communications common carrier subject to federal regula-
tion, and Bunker-Ramo Corporation, one of three firms offering an
"on line-real time" stock quotation service to the financial community
over the private long-line wires of Western Union and other com-
munication common carriers. Western Union refused to provide
private long-line service for Bunker-Ramo's proposed Telequote IV
service, a data processing and message-switching service adding to
the capabilities of Telequote III, the basic quotation service.6
The basic Telequote III offering operates through arrangements
with the New York and other stock exchanges. Information con-
cerning listed securities is gathered, constantly updated and stored
on regionally located magnetic memory drums in Bunker-Ramo com-
puters. A broker, by dialing the Bunker-Ramo computer, can in-
stantaneously obtain data regarding last price sold, last price offered
and so forth for any of the stocks traded on the exchanges. Telequote
IV was designed to add a message-switching capacity, by means of
which the various offices of subscribing brokerage firms could com-
municate with each other. Telequote IV would permit a buy or sell
order from a particular branch office of a broker to be sent to and
stored in a regional computer until polled by a central computer,
checked for parity and forwarded to the broker's office or to the
broker's representative on the floor of the exchange. Execution orders
would be routed back to the branch office from which they originated
in similar fashion.7  In addition to this message-switching service,
Telequote IV was to afford information storage and processing serv-
ices with respect to margin accounts and financial research.' The
computers were to be programmed so as not to allow any information
except that specifically provided for in the Telequote III or IV propo-
sals to be sent over the private lines.9
6For communications relating to the Bunker-Ramo dispute, see Letter from
Arnold, Fortas & Porter to Bunker-Ramo Corporation, March 12, 1965; Letter
from Arnold, Fortas & Porter to Honorable William Henry, Commissioner, Federal
Communications Commission, Aug. 29, 1965; Letter from Arnold, Fortas & Porter
to Bunker-Ramo Corporation, Aug. 29, 1965; Letter from American Telephone &
Telegraph Co. to Mr. Ben F. Waple, Secretary, Federal Communications Com-
mission, Sept. 29, 1965; Letter from Western Union Telegraph Co. to Mr. Ben F.
Waple, Dec. 3, 1965; Letter from Grove, Paglin, Jaskewicz, Gillian & Putbriese to
Mr. Ben F. Waple, Jan. 17, 1966; Letter from Arnold & Porter to Mr. Walter B.
Kelley, Assistant Vice-President, American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Feb. 4,
1966; Letter from Mr. Walter B. Kelley to Arnold & Porter, Feb. 16, 1966.
7This description is taken from a memorandum on the functions performed in
the Telequote IV System, accompanying Letter from Arnold & Porter to Mr. Walter
B. Kelley, Assistant Vice-President, American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Feb. 4,
1966.
SThe description of Telequote IV as originally planned is found in Letter from
Arnold, Fortas & Porter to Bunker-Ramo Corporation, March 12, 1965.
9 See Letter from Arnold, Fortas & Porter to Bunker-Ramo Corporation,
Aug. 29, 1965.
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The refusal of Western Union to provide Bunker-Ramo with
the private line service required for Telequote IV was concurred in
by AT&T. Two arguments were advanced in support of this position:
first, Bunker-Ramo was not entitled to such service under the pub-
lished tariffs of the carriers; second, should Bunker-Ramo undertake
such a service, it would be subject to direct FCC regulation under the
Communications Act' 0 as a communications common carrier. The
dispute was eventually settled through negotiation," but in the process
several issues which will become increasingly important as data
processing services multiply were left undecided.
The Private Line Tariffs of the Common Carriers
Western Union's primary objection was based on the wording
of its published tariff schedule. This schedule, which has the effect
of law,'2 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 3.2. Only the following may be authorized users:
(a) Persons, firms or corporations who are to receive
or send communications from or to the customer only and
relating solely to the customer's business.'
Western Union argued that the messages, sent between brokerage offices
and switched by the Bunker-Ramo computers, would be messages "to"
one office "from" another for which the computer would be only a
conduit. Bunker-Ramo, on the other hand, argued that each message
would travel first "to" a Bunker-Ramo computer and then "from"
that computer to the broker.
An explanation of the nature of the private line service of the
carriers is necessary to place these arguments in proper perspective. As
first developed, the private line was a means by which parties carrying
on a large amount of specified communication by wire could avoid the
use of the general exchange systems offered by the communication
carriers and maintain the availability of constant communicating
capacity. As described in one early decision:
These lines are not connected to the general exchange system.
The wires used and the instruments attached to them are
owned and maintained by the telephone company. The com-
pany does not permit telephone instruments not owned by it to
be attached to these lines. There is no switching permitted or
10 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-22 (1964).
ISee Letter from Arnold & Porter to Mr. Walter B. Kelley, Assistant Vice-
President, American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Feb. 4, 1966. AT&T provided
lines for the "modified" Telequote IV service. There is a possibility that this was
a result of greater flexibility in the language of the AT&T tariff. See note 17 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 20-25 infra.
13 Western Union, Tariff FCC No. 237, original at 17, issued Mar. 14, 1966,
effective April 17, 1966.
COMPUTER SERVICES
provided for between stations of such a system. Communica-
tion may be had between several stations and a central point
but the different stations are not connected one with the other.
Brokers are said to be the principal users of private line
systems. They are used mainly between points where they
have a great deal of communication.14
Prior to the advent of computerized technology, it appears that
the communication-by-voice nature of the private line service changed
to permit non-voice communication by wire, while the restrictions
upon customer attachments were relaxed sufficiently to permit con-
nection of the data processing input, output and computerized storage
facilities to the telephone wires. Other than these changes, the con-
cept of the private wire service appears to have remained constant,
explaining to some degree the "from or to" requirement of the
carriers' tariffs. The Telequote III offering appears as the modern
equivalent of the old brokerage private line arrangement, permitting
communications only between the individual brokerage offices and
the Bunker-Ramo computers, the latter constituting the central points
of the system. The quotation requests are messages which begin
in an office, travel only to the computer and return to the original
office. Similarly, the computer's job with respect to the informa-
tion originated on the floor of the exchange about a particular stock
is potentially completed when that information is stored in the com-
puter. The communication of this message to a broker depends upon
a specific request by the broker and hence is not a necessary part of
any communication between the computer and the system of exchanges
from which the information originates. In these two instances, then,
the messages handled over the private line system can, for practical
purposes, be said to be "from or to" the computer. Not explained,
however, is the modification of the private line service which permits
Bunker-Ramo to constitute, in the person of its computers, the "central
points" of the communication systems.
In light of this development of the private line concept, therefore,
it is arguable that, as Western Union contended, the transfer of ad-
ministrative data and of buy and sell orders (the Telequote IV of-
fering) would constitute the handling of communications through
the computers of Bunker-Ramo which, in that situation, would re-
semble the facilities of a regular telephone company.
The strength of this somewhat metaphysical argument has been
undercut, however, by AT&T's acquiescence in the handling by
Bunker-Ramo, as part of a modified Telequote IV offering, of the
buy and sell orders and the executions of those orders.'5 This sug-
14 Re New York Tel. Co., 44 P.U.R. (n.s.) 265, 269-70 (N.Y. Dep't, State Div.,
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1942) (emphasis added).
l5 Letter from Mr. Walter B. Kelley, Assistant Vice-President, American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. to Arnold & Porter, Feb. 16, 1966.
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gests, following the earlier analysis, that AT&T has relaxed its stand
against the handling by a customer of messages which by their nature
do not end at a Bunker-Ramo computer and, hence, cannot be said
to be "from or to" Bunker-Ramo. The description of the process by
which buy and sell orders and executions are handled shows that the
difference between it and the system which would handle the con-
tested administrative data is slight. The buy and sell orders will be
sent to either the central brokerage firm or the floor of the exchange;
to this extent, there is a choice of recipient. When executions take
place, they will be sent back to the office from which they originated,16
a process which will necessitate some means by which to direct them.
Thus, there will be, in both directions, a process comparable to
message-switching or the switching of message direction. Admittedly,
however, the choice of recipient is limited compared to that which
would exist under a full message-switching system where authorized
users could communicate between any of their offices.
The second element of the tariff requires that a message relate
"solely to the customer's business." Although this language is am-
biguous, it is arguably inconsistent with the nature of both Telequote
III and Telequote IV, which are, by definition, services for the benefit
of the brokerage industry, naturally relating to that industry. The
messages which involve message-switching, and those which do not,
relate to the brokerage business in the same way; both aid the sub-
scriber firms in their brokerage business. The language of the present
AT&T tariff is similar, requiring that messages be to and from the
customer and "relate directly to the customer's business." 17 In the
present context, this would require a direct relation of every message
16 See memorandum, supra note 7.
17 American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Tariff FCC No. 260, original at 17,
issued March 14, 1966, effective Oct. 16, 1966.
The AT&T tariff originally required that a message "relate solely to the cus-
tomer's business." This language was changed to its present form in 1963, over the
objections of Scantlin Electronics, Inc., which petitioned the FCC for a suspension
of the tariff and a hearing on the changes. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co., Tariff No. 134, Petition of Scantlin Electronics, Inc., July 12, 1963. The peti-
tion described Scantlin's use of leased private lines to supply computer information,
id. at 2-5, and expressed concern that the change in language would be construed
to restrict or prevent the continuation of these services. Id. at 8-9. AT&T replied
that the Scantlin services, as then constituted, would violate neither the existing
nor the new tariff. The FCC opinion concluded that "the Commission is of the
view that the proposed tariff amendments will not restrict or prevent [Scantlin]
from providing the services described . . . ." Re American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, Tariff No. 134, FCC 63-752, Dkt. 38,399 (August 7, 1963).
The petition also noted, as among the services offered by Scantlin:
Similarly, the computer can be used by [Scantlin's] broker clients to
obtain instantaneous calculations of customers' margin positions. A branch
office can interrogate the computer which in turn will interrogate the head
office, determine the content of the customers' portfolio and his current bal-
ance, compute buying power on the basis of up-to-date market prices, and
transmit the result to the interrogating office.
Petition, supra at 3. This amounts to a message-switching service similar to the
original Telequote IV offering, but more limited in scope.
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to the business of data processing, that is, information storage and
processing, which by its very nature bears the same relation to every
message which it is programmed to handle.
The data processing offering, however, would probably not be
prohibited under this "direct relation" test, following the reasoning
set forth in Aeronautical Radio, Inc. [ARINC] v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co.18  The ARINC case dealt with an application for private
wire service by a company licensed by the FCC to coordinate com-
munications relating to air traffic and weather conditions for the
purpose of furthering safety in air travel and transport. AT&T refused
to furnish the facilities contending, inter alia, that ARINC would be
handling communications in which it had no direct interest, contrary
to the tariff restrictions. Although the Commission did not reverse
AT&T's refusal because of a technical flaw in the application, it stated,
in disposing of AT&T's major contention:
It must be concluded that no interest in the content of
the messages handled is necessary, but that it is sufficient if the
fact that the message is sent aids the lessee in carrying out
purposes of its own distinct from those of a common carrier
for hire. 9
Just as every message relating to air safety may be a direct interest
of ARINC, so may the messages dealing with stock quotations, buy
and sell orders or administrative data bear a "direct relation" to the
business of Bunker-Ramo. This "direct relation" language, then,
is not in itself sufficient reason to deny carrier facilities to an applicant.
It should be noted, finally, that the tariff language discussed
above, while important, may not be determinative of the dispute.
Tariffs must be "just and reasonable" 20 whether they relate simply
to charges or to "practices, classifications and regulations." 21 Those
which are unjust or unreasonable are unlawful,22 and may be chal-
lenged upon submission or after FCC approval by either a private
party or the FCC. Where the FCC determines that a tariff is in
violation of the Communications Act, it may prescribe practices which
it deems "just, fair, and reasonable." 24 However, until the Com-
mission determines that the tariff is unreasonable, it has the effect of
law.
25
184 F.C.C. 155 (1937).
19 Id. at 164.
20 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1964).
211d.
22Id.
2347 U.S.C. §§ 204, 205(a), 208 (1964).
2447 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1964).
25 Despite the disparagement of plaintiffs that the tariff is initially the hand-
work of the Telephone Companies' scriveners and is, at any event, not a
rate but a mere equipment tariff, . . . . a tariff, required by law to be filed
is not a mere contract. It is the law.
Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.2d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Competition Between Customer and Carrier
The other tariff provisions raised in the Bunker-Ramo dispute
prohibit the use of a private line service for an undertaking "for which
a payment or other compensation shall be received by . . . the cus-
tomer," 26 and empower the carrier to cancel a private line service
when it is used "for the purpose of performing any service in com-
petition with the service which the [carrier] . . . may now or
hereafter furnish." 2 It is clear that these provisions read more
strictly than they are applied. Bunker-Ramo, under Telequote III,
is using a private line in a service "for which a payment" is received
by it, so to this extent at least the tariff has not been enforced by
the carriers.
Some clarification as to the intended scope of these provisions
is presented in the ARINC case, in which the Commission noted:
The chief purposes of the restrictions in defendant's tariff
rules appear from the brief of defendant to be to prevent the
facilities . . . from being used by other common carriers
of communications, and to prevent the creation of middlemen
competitors between defendant and its customers with a re-
sulting diminution of defendant's revenues and possible dis-
crimination in charges to the public.
28
Thus, the carrier's basic concern is with those who might attempt to
use the carrier facilities to compete in offering communications to
the public, forcing the carrier to become a wholesaler of communica-
tions which it could "retail" itself.
The extent to which common carriers are to be protected, under
the Communications Act, from any economic harm due to competition
is unclear. In the recent case of ln re Finer Living, Inc.,29 the FCC
faced the problem of whether the existence of common carrier facilities
capable of performing the function of a proposed private microwave
system precluded the grant of a license to the private applicants. Rely-
ing on an earlier report on this question,3" the Commission held that
the private license could be issued. The report had posed the question
of whether the Communications Act, either on its face or by implica-
28 American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Tariff FCC No. 260, 1st Rev. at 20,
issued May 10, 1966, effective June 9, 1966; accord, Western Union, Tariff FCC
No. 237, 4th Rev. at 12, issued Sept. 9, 1966, effective Oct. 16, 1966.
27 American Telephone & Telegraph Co., FCC No. 260, 1st Rev. at 20, issued
May 10, 1966, effective June 9, 1966. Accord, Western Union, Tariff FCC No. 237,
2d Rev. at 14, issued June 30, effective Aug. 5, 1966.
2
8 Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 4 F.C.C. 155, 165-66
(1937) (emphasis added).
29 8 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1160 (1966).
30 In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 me, 18 P & F Ranio
REG. 1767 (1960).
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tion from the "public interest" standard, required the Commission
to protect the common carriers from the possible economic harm of
private system competition. Finding no express statutory command,
the Commission report indicated that:
The touchstone of the Communications Act is not the
fostering of competition per se, but rather that course which
will best serve the public interest, convenience and necessity.
In the application of these criteria, certainly, competition
would be one, but not the sole, factor to be considered."1
The Finer Living case, however, may not be entirely relevant.
First, the FCC was not required to deal with the additional problem
of requiring a utility to aid its competitors by allowing resale of its
services. The Commission report on the microwave situation did
briefly consider, however, whether a carrier could be compelled to
connect a private microwave system to its communications network,
implying that the costs of establishing such systems and the tariffs
themselves would be sufficient to limit competition.32 Second, there
is a distinction between the "public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity" standard 33 applicable to licensing of broadcasting stations " and
certificates of convenience for the construction of common carriers 35
and the "just and reasonable" standard applicable to the tariff provi-
sions. 6 While the former permits consideration of the competitive
implications of a particular offering, the latter concentrates on a balanc-
ing of customer and carrier interests. In the instant context, any such
balancing also should consider the larger interests of the data processing
industry.
Furthermore, the tariff issues under consideration should be
recognized for what they are: policy questions inextricably related
to the broader problem of the conflict between regulated and non-
regulated economic entities. A possible approach to this problem is
suggested in Philco Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.3 ' The court,
while denying jurisdiction over a tariff dispute between a television
station and a common carrier, said:
[W]hether these [tariff] regulations should be held to be
beyond the statutory power of the Telephone Company to
adopt may depend upon a consideration of economic relations,
31 Id. at 1788. This was a paraphrase of the Supreme Courts opinion in FCC v,
RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
32 18 P & F RADIo REG. at 1789.
3347 U.S.C. §309(a) (1964).
84 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
35 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1964).
3647 U.S.C. §201(b) (1964).
87 80 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
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of facts peculiar to the business or its history, of competitive
conditions and other relevant circumstances generally un-
familiar to a judicial tribunal, but well understood by an ad-
ministrative body especially trained and experienced in the
intricate and technical facts and usages in the television
communications filed [sic] . s
Taking this approach, one must note immediately the basic dis-
tinction between the Bunker-Ramo situation and the typical resale
case-the mixed nature of the data processing offering. Whereas
the usual resale case deals with a clear attempt to retail only com-
munications, the Bunker-Ramo situation involves a communications
service which is intimately connected to a non-communications service.
The implications of this are significant. Should Western Union, for
example, offer a system capable of message-switching, it would be
natural to couple this offering with the related stock quotation services.
Should Bunker-Ramo be prevented from offering a message-switching
service, the common carriers could monopolize this aspect of data
processing. The common carrier could be required, of course, to
offer the two services separately, but this would not prevent a cost
discounting by the carrier in the competitive service which could be
made up by higher pricing in the monopolized area.39 The resultant
package probably would be more attractive to a prospective subscriber
than a package consisting of a limited quotation service from the in-
dependent firm and a separate message-switching service from the
carrier. This advantage would be further enhanced by the carriers'
influence over entry into the data processing field 4 and their ability
to withstand substantial losses incurred in price wars.
4 1
Telequote IV: A Communications Common Carrier Service?
Bunker-Ramo's alleged status as a common carrier of communi-
cations raised the second main issue in the case, since the tariff lan-
guage denying service to a competitor was aimed at other common
carriers of communications.' If Bunker-Ramo were found to be a
common carrier, it would be subject to rate and tariff regulation 3
and the expenses entailed in complying with financial reporting re-
quirements " and resulting from litigation before regulatory agencies.
38 Id. at 399. This test is derived directly from 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1964).
39 See Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 Y.ALE LJ.
1299, 1305-06, 1308-09 (1967).
40 Id. at 1306-08.
4 1 Id. at 1310.
42 See text accompanying note 28 supra. Viewed in this light, § 3.2 of the
Western Union tariff, see text accompanying note 13 supra, can also be seen as
an anti-retailing provision.
43 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1964).
44 47 U.S.C. §§ 219-20 (1964).
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Furthermore, it would remain entirely dependent upon the common
carriers providing the facilities because the FCC has held that it has
no jurisdiction over contracts between common carriers involving
the use of each other's facilities, although it has requested legislation
to overcome this disability." Through such contracts the carrier
could charge for the use of its facilities in such a way as to discriminate
openly in favor of itself, thereby achieving market dominance over
the data processing firms. If found not to be a common carrier,
Bunker-Ramo, although still subject to the more subtle forms of
carrier discrimination,46 would have a stronger position on the tariff
and open discrimination issues. Thus, although a determination of
Bunker-Ramo's legal status does not completely resolve the problems,
it does provide a point of departure for further action.
The claim that Bunker-Ramo's Telequote IV service constituted
a common carriage offering must be considered within the context of
the Communications Act of 1934, passed twenty years before the
advent of the computer industry.4 7  This attempt to bring a revolu-
tionary technology within a decades-old statutory framework is bound
to prove unsatisfactory, but it must be attempted, if only to determine
the areas in which amendatory legislation would be helpful.
The governing statute, section 3 (h) of the Communications Act,
states: "'Common carrier' . . . means any person engaged as a com-
mon carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by
wire. . . , 48 "Communication by wire" is defined by section 3 (a) as
the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and
sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other like connec-
tion between the points of origin and reception of such trans-
mission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus,
and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding
and delivery of communications) incidental to such trans-
mission.4
These definitions are of little assistance in defining the "common"
element of a carrier or, in fact, a "carrier." The language of section
3(h) does indicate, however, that the phrase "common carrier for
hire" merely includes that entity engaged in communication by wire,
that is, transmission (by virtue of section 3 (a)).
45 S. 2989, H.R. 14109, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See note 72 infra.
46 See Irwin, supra note 39, at 1305-06, 1308-09.
47 The first computer sold for business data processing purposes was delivered
in 1954. By 1962, there were 16,187 computers installed. J. BERNSTEIN, THE
ANALYTICAL ENGINE: COMPUTERS, PAST, PRESENT, AND FuTURE 81 (1966).
4847 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1964).
4947 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1964).
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The "carriage" concept in the communication context is "trans-
mission," a word not defined in the Act. It is plain that, at the time
of enactment, "communication by wire" was thought to include the
total message service of a communications operation such as Western
Union or the AT&T general telephone service. Such operations
typically included wire facilities over which messages in the form of
electric impulses would travel as well as instrumentalities for the
sending, directing and receiving of such messages. This is made clear
by the statutory inclusion of "receipt, forwarding, and delivery of
communications by wire."
In Telequote III, Bunker-Ramo furnishes facilities for the receipt
and delivery of communications through input and output devices.
Through the leasing arrangement with Western Union, moreover,
it appears to offer its customers the transmission package of wire
facilities connected to these receiving and delivery devices. The pro-
posed Telequote IV would have added, through its message-switching
capacity, the additional service of "forwarding" messages from one
location to another. To some extent, therefore, Bunker-Ramo is en-
gaged in "communication by wire." In Telequote III, such com-
munication is only between others and itself. Bunker-Ramo is actively
engaged on one side of every communication that travels over the
leased wires. Telequote IV, however, offers a full communication
service with respect to some messages-the facilities owned and leased
by Bunker-Ramo constitute a mere conduit for these messages, the
same type of service performed on a more general scale by the typical
telephone or telegraph company. Thus, although the Telequote III
service falls within the "communication by wire" concept, the service
contemplated under Telequote IV more closely approximates the
normal service of those communication "common carriers" in existence
when the Communications Act was passed.
Since both services arguably fit the statutory criteria of one
engaged in "communication by wire" it remains to be determined
whether they should be brought within the "common carrier for hire"
jurisdiction of the Communications Act. The legislative history of
section 3(h) is of little assistance. It states that:
the definition does not include any person if not a common
carrier in the ordinary sense of the term, and therefore does
not include press associations and other organizations en-
gaged in the business of collecting and distributing news
services which may refuse to furnish to any person service
which they are capable of furnishing, and may furnish service
under varying arrangements, establishing the service to be
rendered, the terms under which rendered, and the charges
therefor.5
90 H.th CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sesi. 45-46 (1933).
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It has been suggested that a common carrier "in the ordinary
sense of the term" refers to the common law definition.5' This re-
quires an examination of the nature of a common carrier in the
transportation industries, the domain of carriage regulation prior to
the advent of modern communications. At common law, "one who
undertakes for hire to transport from place to place the property of
others who may choose to employ him is a common carrier." 52 Certain
carriers, by reason of the far-reaching importance of their business
activities, were thought to have dedicated the use of their private
property to the public. Having created a public interest in their ac-
tivity, these carriers became subject to government protection on behalf
of that interest. 3 Carriage for the public at large was seen as an
undertaking sufficiently important to warrant considerable public in-
tervention. From this standpoint, it is the "for hire" element in a
carriage operation which is decisive as to legal status and the other
criteria sometimes said to denote the existence of a common carrier,
such as the lack of power to discriminate between customers, follow
only as a matter of public policy once the common carrier status is
determined.
The FCC cases dealing with the common carrier concept have
retained this concern for the scope of the "for hire" element of a
particular communications offering, but have developed an additional
interest, dictated by the nature of communications, in deciding the
question of control over the specific communications involved. This
reasoning has been applied to the recent group of cases dealing with
the legal status of community antenna television systems. In Frontier
Broadcasting Co. v. Collier,4 the Commission defined a communica-
tion common carrier as follows:
Fundamental to the concept of communications common
carrier is that such a carrier holds itself out or makes a public
offering to provide facilities by wire or radio whereby all
members of the public who choose to employ such facilities
and to compensate the carrier therefor may communicate or
transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing be-
tween points on the system of that carrier and other carriers
connecting with it. In other words, the carrier provides the
means or ways of communication for the transmission of such
intelligence as the subscriber may choose to have transmitted.
The choice of the specific intelligence to be transmitted is,
51 Letter from Arnold, Fortas & Porter to Bunker-Ramo Corporation, Mar. 12,
1965.
52 Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U.S. 207, 211
(1927).
s See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-36 (1876).
54 16 P & F RADio REG. 1005 (1958).
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therefore, the sole responsibility or prerogative of the sub-
scriber and not the carrier."
Following this standard, the Commission held that a CATV system
was not a common carrier offering because, although it offered to
transmit television signals to anyone desiring to subscribe, "the specific
signals received and distributed by the CATV system are, of necessity,
determined by the CATV system and not the subscriber." 56
Applying these concerns to the services proposed by Bunker-Ramo,
one finds that they serve partially to exempt these services from the
concept of a communication common carrier. In Telequote III,
Bunker-Ramo limits the communications which travel over the private
lines to stock quotations and related information and there is no
communication between the subscribers to the service. This is similar
to the type of service discussed in Subscription Television Inquiry,
5 7
in which the Commission said:
It has been a fundamental concept in the communications
field that a person is not a 'common carrier' of communica-
tions where he is providing his subscribers primarily with a
news or information service, rather than with a communica-
tion service enabling subscribers to communicate among
themselves. Thus for example, while the furnishing of leased
wires or radio circuits by the telephone or telegraph carriers
is part of their common carrier activities, the use of such
leased wires by the news services to transmit news to their
subscribers, or by the stock exchange to transmit price quota-
tions has been held not to involve common carrier operations.
Similarly in the case of subscription radio or television pro-
gram services, the subscribing members of the public would
be paying for the programs rather than for the use of the com-
munication facilities."8
This reasoning seems to place the Telequote III offering beyond the
common carrier concept and may explain the past acquiesence of
the carriers in leasing lines for service. It does not appear to exempt
the Telequote IV service which does provide "a communication service
enabling subscribers to communicate among themselves."
.55Id. at 1008-09; accord, Industrial Radiolocation Service, 8 P & F RAD Io REG.
2d 1545 (1966); WSTV, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 23 P & F RADIo REG. 184
(1962) ; CATV and Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
The FCC, however, has since attempted to regulate CATV systems under other
provisions of the Communications Act. The question is now before the Supreme
Court. See Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3167 (October 24, 1967).
5616 P &FRADio REG. at 1009.
577 P &FRADIo Ra. 2d 1501 (1966).
58 Id. at 1513 (emphasis added).
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The "Primary Business" Test
Subscription Television Inquiry, however, does suggest a basis
upon which to exempt both services. Paraphrasing the language from
that case, this solution would define a communications "common car-
rier" as one who "is providing his subscribers primarily . . . with
a communications service enabling subscribers to communicate among
themselves." This language indicates the possibility of adopting a
variant of the "primary business" test, which has been urged by
Bunker-Ramo as fully exempting it from the common carrier juris-
diction of the FCC.
The "primary business" test, as it has evolved in the transporta-
tion area, necessitates gauging the extent to which a carrier provides
carriage for hire in a case where some, and often most, of its carrier
operations are clearly not offered for hire but are a natural part of
a non-carrier business. The test is, by its very nature, one of grada-
tions, encompassing the gamut of enterprises in which actual carriage
plays a greater or lesser role in terms of income, expense or other
operating criteria. It is ideally suited to one engaged in a manu-
facturing-type business entailing the carriage of his finished product
to its point of sale. 9 Such a manufacturer carries only for himself
and those with whom he trades in his non-carrier business and, while
he will naturally try to recoup his carriage expenditures through sale
revenues, it is only by extreme reasoning that he can be said to be
offering his carriage operation "for hire"-it is only an incidental
portion of his total business which he feels economically compelled to
perform.
While the FCC has not expressly adopted the "primary business"
test, there is some indication beyond Subscription Television that it is
amenable to such an approach. Analogous reasoning, which avoids
the considerable financial paper work inherent in basing the test upon
operating criteria, is found in Industrial Radiolocation Service,6° in
which the FCC excluded from common carrier status a service which,
through the use of radio waves, provided various geological and other
scientific services to its subscribers. In reaching its result, the Com-
mission said:
Central Committee indicated that the petroleum industry, as
one of the principal customers of Radiolocation Service licen-
sees, has never believed that communications service for-hire
was being rendered. The Committee stated that the service
received is engineering in nature and the use of communica-
tions facilities is incidental to this principal function."
59 See, e.g., L. A. Woltishek Common Carrier Application, 42 M.C.C. 193
(1943).
60 8 P & F Rio REG. 2d 1545 (1966).
61 Id. at 1551.
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It should be noted that this "primary business" test serves the needs
of Telequote III more than Telequote IV. While the former is in a posi-
tion analogous to that of a manufacturer who transports his own goods,
the latter represents the communications equivalent of a manufacturer
who transports not only his own finished product but also the goods
of others. In transportation, this is the problem of "return hauling"
by a private carrier, 2 which has been treated differently from the
normal "primary business" situation. There is no reason, however,
why the reasoning of the "primary business" test cannot be effectively
applied to a situation like that of Telequote IV, since the objective
would be the same: to free from regulation those firms which offer
a communications service incidental to and intimately connected with
a data processing service.
Adoption of the "primary business" test would probably be held
within the competence of the FCC. In Philadelphia Television Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC,O in which the Commission's holding that CATV
systems were not communications common carriers was upheld, the
court said:
In approaching the problem of statutory interpretation
before us, we show "great deference to the interpretation
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration. 'To sustain the Commission's application of
this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is
the only reasonable one or even that it is the result we would
have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in
judicial proceedings.' "
We think such deference to the agency's interpretation
of its governing statute is reinforced where, as here, the legis-
lative history is silent, or at best unhelpful, with respect to
the point in question. Congress in passing the Communica-
tions Act in 1934 could not, of course, anticipate the variety
and nature of methods of communication by wire or radio
that would come into existence in the decades to come. In
such a situation, the expert agency entrusted with the adminis-
tration of a dynamic industry is entitled to latitude in coping
with new developments in that industry. 4
It is true that the holding was partially based on the fact that the
FCC had alternative jurisdiction over CATV systems under the
broadcasting sections of the Act, a fact which the court felt broadened
the Commission's scope of action, 5 but the lack of such alternative
62See Red Ball Freight Co. v. ICC, 377 U.S. 311 (1965); Porter, Federal
Regulation of Private Carriers, 64 HARV. L. REv. 896, 905-06 (1951).
63359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
64 Id. at 283-84.
65Id. at 284.
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jurisdiction should not be determinative in the instant context. Cer-
tainly, the dynamic quality of the communications industry is best
shown in the case of data processing. Similarly, such rapid change
was unanticipated by the 1934 legislation. The "primary business"
test, in the present context, represents a reasonable effort to balance
competing considerations in order to create a workable structure
and should, in the absence of a clearer statutory mandate, be ac-
ceptable to the courts.
REGULATION OF THE CARRIERS' DATA PROCESSING SERVICES
Closely related to the legal status of data processing firm offerings
is the data processing potential of the common carriers, which are
relying increasingly upon digital computers for the automation of their
communication services," a potential demonstrated by Western Union's
entry into the data processing field.67 Western Union has not filed
tariffs for its data processing services. 8 It is consistent with the
above analysis that it should not be required to file such tariffs, if
combined communication-data processing services are kept separate
from "purer" communications services and held to the same limita-
tions imposed on data processing firms by the "primary business"
test. This solution provides for maximum competition in the data
processing field consistent with the regulatory requirements of the
Communications Act. It encourages separation of "mixed" carrier
offerings from those clearly intended to be regulated, to the extent
that it encourages a carrier to price the former as a single package.
It does not, of course, prevent the more subtle means of carrier dis-
crimination in favor of themselves.
The AT&T system, possessing tremendous computer capacity,
has not yet entered the data processing field. The explanation for
this may well be a 1956 consent decree which prohibits AT&T from
"engaging. . . in any business other than the furnishing of common
carrier communications services . . . or . . . businesses or services
incidental to the furnishing . . . of common carrier communications
services." 69 Jurisdiction over AT&T lies with the district court.
Hence, the FCC does not have the usual opportunity to pass on a
specific service through the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It is
suggested, however, that the Justice Department recognize the perva-
sive issues involved and consider whether they might best be left
to resolution by the FCC.
6 0Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE L.J.
1299, 1301-02.
67 Western Union Telegraph Co. Prospectus, December 5, 1966, at 5, 6, 8-9.
68See Irwin, .supra note 66, at 1304. However, ITT World Communications
Inc. has recently submitted a tariff covering a message-switching service. ITT World
Communications Inc., Tariff FCC No. 54.
69 United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 1168,246, at 71,132
(D.N.J. 1956).
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CONCLUSION: A MEASURED RESPONSE
This Comment is based on the assumption that, given the present
lack of knowledge, it is best to defer regulation of data processing
firms which may well be subject to regulation by the FCC as a result
of their increasing dependence on common carrier communication
facilities. This assumption may be subject to dispute on formalistic
grounds. There are those who contend: (1) that such data processing
services have all the "earmarks" of public utilities; 7 (2) that such
services are clearly covered (a) by a statute which was drawn up
without computer services in mind and is in many senses inadequate
to deal with the problem, and (b) by carrier tariffs which were also
drawn up with other situations in mind and which should present
no obstacle to the public interest in development and dissemination
of computer services.
Such objections appear woefully inadequate in the face of the
distinct possibility that regulation at the present time might well deter
entry into and development of this relatively young and competitive
industry. If the message-switching services are held to entail either
partial or complete regulation of data processing firms, there is a much
greater possibility that the present common carriers, given their capital
positions and ability to discriminate in favor of themselves, will be
given effective control of the "mixed bag" of data processing services
under consideration.71 This will enable them to gain substantial power
in the "purer" data processing market. Those firms put to the choice
of either not offering message-switching service or submitting to
regulation and choosing the former course must face the distinct
possibility that the carriers will undercut the private firms' position
in the non-regulated market. Even partial regulation, limited to that
part of the service associated with message-switching, would neces-
sitate the separation of cost components, an extremely difficult and
expensive operation when the same computer handles both services.
In short, the public interest would appear to be best served by con-
tinued competition, while no such advantage can be seen, at present,
to inhere to regulation of the data processing firms which will surely
have sufficient problems competing with the carriers if, as has been
suggested, the latter are allowed to enter the data processing market.
Adoption of the "primary business" test, on the other hand,
permits the development of computer service technology to proceed
in a competitive atmosphere, thereby limiting the extent to which
carriers may use their present monopoly power to expand dispropor-
tionately in economic areas theoretically free from such power. It is
7OSee D. PARxiaILL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY 148 (1966).
But see P. BARAN, T E COMING COMPUTER UTILITY-LAISSEZ-FAIRE, LICENSING OR
REGuLATioN? 8-9 (1967) ; Irwin, mpra note 66, at 1313-17.
71See text accompanying notes 38-41, 43-46 supra.
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true that this will not obviate the opportunity for carriers to price
private line service so as to discriminate in favor of themselves.
This problem is inherent in the wholesale nature of their operations
and the danger presented, although real, does not presently seem a
sufficient reason to prohibit such carriers from offering mixed services.
The "primary business" test, if implemented by the FCC, will
probably require some adjustments in the current tariffs of the car-
riers. Such tariff modification could be applied consistently with that
test if the restrictions on resale were applied only to sales to another
common carrier. By virtue of the "primary business" test, restrictions
on resale would apply only to those firms which merely desired to gain
the economic rewards of common carriage, without the substantial
investment which such status normally entails.
Another, and perhaps more satisfactory, solution to this problem
would be to expand upon the legislation recently proposed by the
FCC in relation to inter-carrier exchange of service operations. The
proposed legislation provides, in essence, for forced inter-carrier leasing
of facilities based on a "fair and reasonable" standard supplemented
by considerations of "public convenience and necessity." 72
Applied to applications for the use of carrier facilities by data
processing firms (firms presumably exempted from regulation by
reason of the "primary business" test), a supplement to this proposed
statute would provide:
Upon petition by a party to a contract or arrangement provid-
ing communication facilities for data processing purposes, or
on its own motion, the Commission, after full opportunity for
hearing, may modify or prescribe the terms and conditions
72 This legislation provides in pertinent part:
Upon petition by a party to any such contract or arrangement, or on its own
motion, the Commission, after full opportunity for hearing, may modify or
prescribe the terms and conditions under which the facilities described therein
shall be provided if it finds that such modification or prescription is fair
and reasonable, that it will not be unfairly or unreasonably discriminatory
in relation to any other contract or arrangement between one of the parties
and another common carrier, and that it will serve the public convenience and
necessity.
(b) The Commission may, upon petition by a common carrier, and
after full opportunity for hearing, order a common carrier to provide facili-
ties for interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to the petition-
ing carrier if it finds (i) that such action is in the public interest; (ii) that
the carriers have been unable to agree with respect to the provision of such
facilities; (iii) that the provision of such facilities will not impair the ability
of the supplying carrier to perform its duty to the public; and (iv) that such
facilities are reasonably available without the construction of new facilities.
If the carriers involved fail to agree upon the terms and conditions under
which such facilities are to be furnished, the Commission, after full oppor-
tunity for hearing, may prescribe such terms and conditions as it finds will
be fair and reasonable, will not be unfairly or unreasonably discriminatory
in relation to any other contract or arrangement between one of the parties
and another common carrier, and will serve the public convenience and
necessity.
S. 2989, H.R. 14109, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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under which the facilities described therein shall be provided
if it finds that such modification or prescription is fair and
reasonable, that it will not be unfairly or unreasonably dis-
criminatory in relation to any other contract or arrangement
between the common carrier and any other party and that it
will serve the public convenience and necessity.
(b) The Commission may, upon petition by a party intend-
ing to use communication facilities for data processing pur-
poses and after full opportunity for hearing, order a common
carrier to provide facilities for interstate or foreign communi-
cation by wire or radio to the petitioning party if it finds
(i) that such action is in the public interest; (ii) that the
parties have been unable to agree with respect to the provision
of such facilities; (iii) that the provision of such facilities
will not impair the ability of the supplying carrier to perform
its duty to the public; and (iv) that such facilities are rea-
sonably available without the construction of new facilities.
If the parties involved fail to agree upon the terms and
conditions under which such facilities are to be furnished, the
Commission, after full opportunity for hearing, may prescribe
such terms and conditions as it finds will be fair and reason-
able, will not be unfairly or unreasonably discriminatory in
relation to any other contract or arrangement between the
common carrier and any other party, and will serve the public
convenience and necessity.
This statute, modeled on the inter-carrier legislation, 3 would,
by supplementing the "just, fair and reasonable" standard with that
of the "public convenience and necessity," substitute a licensing proce-
dure similar to that used in the broadcasting field for the present
tariff approach. Such a procedure would provide the FCC with
considerable leeway to administer the licensing in the light of the
requirements of particular industries or geographical areas. The
Commission would be kept in constant touch with the market power
of data processing firms and be able to measure any tendencies toward
dangerous concentration. Such a structure would also enable the
Commission to handle wasteful duplication of line facilities in the same
locations, should such duplication reach serious levels. In summary,
it would provide the FCC with a flexible tool giving many of the
advantages of regulation without the concomitant disadvantages which
full regulation would presently impose on the data processing industry.
ThSee note 72, .mtpra.
